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INTRODUCTION
In this paper we want to do more than just grvmg another -be it
unusual- example of the utility of t he first-order predicate calculus in
proving the correctness of programs. In addition we want to show how
thanks to a systematic use of the first-order predicate calculus fairly
general -almost "syntactic"- considerations about the formal manipu-
lations involved can provide valuable guidance for the smooth discovery
of an otherwise .surprising argument.
For proofs of program correctness two fairly different styles have been
developed, "operational" proofs and "assertional" proofs. Operational
correctness proofs are based on a model of computation, and the corre-
sponding computational histories are the subject matter of the con-
siderations. In assertional correctness proofs the possibility of interpreting
the program text as executable code is ignored and the program text
itself is the subject matter of the formal considerations.
Operational proofs - although older and, depending on one 's education,
perhaps more "natural" than assertional proofs- have proved to be tricky
to design. For more complicated programs the required classification of
t he possible computational histories tends to lead to an exploding case
analysis in which it becomes very clumsy to verify that no possible
sequence of events has been overlooked, and it was in response to the
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disappointing experiences with operational proofs that the assertional
style has been developed.
The design of an assertional proof -as we shall see below- may present
problems, but, on the whole, experience seems to indicate that assertional
proofs are much more effective than operational ones in reducing the
gnawing uncertainty whether nothing has been overlooked. This ex-
perience, already gained while dealing with sequential programs, was
strongly confirmed while dealing with concurrent programs : the circum-
stance that the ratios of the speeds with which the sequential components
proceed is left undefined greatly increases the class of computational
histories that an operational argument would have to cover!
In the following we shall present the development of an assertional
correctness proof of a program of N -fold concurrency. The program has
been taken from the middle of a whole sequence of concurrent programs
of increasing complexity -the greater complexity at the one end being
the consequence of finer grains of interleaving-. For brevity's sake we
have selected here from this sequence the simplest item for which the
assertional correctness proof displays the characteristic we wanted to show.
(It is not the purpose of this paper to provide supporting material in
favour of the assertional style: in fact, our example is so simple that an
operational proof for it is still perfectly feasible.)
In the following y denotes a vector of N components y[i] for O<,i <N.
With the identifier 1we shall denote a vector-valued function of a vector-
valued argument, and the algorithm concerned solves the equation
(1) u> I(y)
or, introducing 10, /1, 12, ... for the components of 1
(2) y[i] =ft(y) for O<,i<N.
It is assumed that the initial value of y and the function 1 are such
that repeated assignments of the form
(3) <y [i ] := !f(y)
will lead in a finite number of steps to y being a solution of (1). In (3)
we have used Lamport's notation of the angle brackets: they enclose
"atomic actions" which can be implemented by ensuring between their
executions mutual exclusion in time. For the sake of termination we
assume that the sequence of i-values for which the assignments (3) are
carried out is (the proper begin of) a sequence in which each i-value
occurs infinitely often. (We deem this property guaranteed by the usual
assumption of "finite speed ratios"; he who refuses to make that as-
sumption can read the following as a proof of partial correctness.)
For the purpose of this paper it suffices to know that functions! exist
such that with a proper initial value of y equ ation (1) will be solved by
208
a finite number of assignments (3). How for a given function t and initial
value y this property can be established is not the subject of this paper.
(He who refuses to assume that the function t and the initial value of y
have this property is free to do so: he can , again, read the following as a
proof of partial correctness that states that when our concurrent program
has terminated, (1) is satisfied.)
Besides the vector y there is -for the purpose of controlling termi-
nation- a vector h, with boolean elements h[i] for O<,i<N, all of which
are true to start with. We now consider the following program of N-fold
concurrency, in which each atomic action assigns a value to at most one
of the array elements mentioned. We give the program first and shall
explain the notation afterwards.
The concurrent program we are considering consists of the following N
components cpnt( (O<,i<N):
LO: do
L1:
L2j:
od
« E j: h[j]) ~
<if y[i]=h(y) ~ h[i]:=false)
[] y[i]=F/i(y) ~ y[i]: = h(y) ;
(Aj: <h[j ] := t rue»)
fi
In line LO, "(Ej: h[j])" is an abbreviation for
(Ej : O<,j<N: h[j])
for the sake of brevity we shall use this abbreviation throughout this
paper. By writing « E j : h[j]) in the guard we have indicated that the
inspection whether a true h[j] can be found is an atomic action.
The opening angle bracket "<" in L 1 has two corresponding closing
brackets, corresponding to the two "atomic alternatives" ; it means that
in the same atomic action the guards are evaluated and either "h[i] : =
false " or "y[i] := h(y)" is executed. In the latter case, N separate atomic
actions follow, each setting an h[j] to true : in line L2j we have used the
abbreviation "(Aj: <h[j]: = t rue»)" for the program that performs the N
atomic actions <h[O] := t rue) through <h[N -l]:=true) in some order
which we don't specify any further.
In our target state y is a solution of (1), or, more explicitly
(4) (Aj : y[j]=h(y))
holds. We first observe that (4) is an invariant ofthe repeatable statements,
i.e. once true it remains true. In the alternative constructs always the
first atomic alternative will then be selected, and this leaves y, and hence
(4) unaffected. We can even conclude a stronger invariant
(5) non (Ej: h[j]) and (Aj: y[j]= h(y))
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or, equivalently
(5') (Aj: non h[j]) and (Aj: y[j] = fJ(Y))
for, when (5) holds, no assignment h[i]: = false can destroy the truth of
(Aj: non h[j)). When (4) holds, the assumption of finite speed ratios
implies that within a finite number of steps (5) will hold. But then the
guards of the repetitive constructs are false , and all components will
terminate nicely with (4) holding. The critical point is: can we guarantee
that none of the components terminates too soon 1
We shall give an assertional proof, following the technique which has
been pioneered by Gries and Owicki [1]. We call an assertion "universally
true" if and only if it holds between any two atomic actions - i .e. "always"
with respect to the computation, "everywhere" with respect to the text-.
More precisely: proving the universal truth of an assertion amounts to
showing
1) that it holds at initialization
2) that its truth is an invariant of each atomic action.
In order to prove that none of the components terminates too soon,
i.e. that termination implies that (4) holds, we have to prove the universal
truth of
(6) (Ej: h[j]) or (Aj: y[j]=fJ(Y))'
Relation (6) certainly holds when the N components are started because
initially all h[j] are true. We are only left with the obligation to prove
the invariance of (6); the remaining part of this paper is devoted to that
proof, and to how it can be discovered.
We get a hint of the difficulties we may expect when trying to prove
the invariance of (6) with respect to the first atomic alternative of LI:
<y[i]=ft(Y) ---+ h[i]:=false>
as soon as we realize that the first term of (6) is a compact notation for
h[O] or h[l] or ... or h[N-1]
which only changes from true to false when, as a result of "h[i]: = false"
the last true h[j] disappears. That is ugly!
We often prove mathematical theorems by proving a stronger -but,
somehow, more manageable- theorem instead. In direct analogy: instead
of trying to prove the invariant truth of (6) directly, we shall try to
prove the invariant truth of a stronger assertion that we get by replacing
the conditions y[j] = fJ(Y) by stronger ones. Because non R is stronger
than Q provided (Q or R) holds, we can strengthen (6) into
(7) (Ej: h[j]) or (Aj: non RJ)
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provided
(8) (Aj: y[j]=/i(y) or RJ)
holds, (Someone who sees these heuristics presented in this manner for
the first time may experience this as juggling, but I am afraid that it
is quite standard and that we had better get used to it.)
What have we gained by the introduction of the N predicates RJ?
Well, the freedom to choose them! More precisely: the freedom to define
them in such a way that we can prove the universal truth of (8) -which
is structurally quite pleasant- in the usual fashion, while the universal
truth of (7) -which is structurally equally "ugly" as (6)- follows more
or less directly from the definition of the R/s: that is the way in which
we may hope that (7) is more "manageable" than the original (6).
In order to find a proper definition of the R/s, we analyse our obligation
to prove the invariance of (8).
If we only looked at the invariance of (8), we might think that a
definition of the R/s in terms of y:
would be a sensible choice. A moment's reflection tells us that that
definition does not help: it would make (8) universally true by definition,
and the right-hand terms of (6) and (7) would be identical, whereas under
the truth of (8), (7) was intended to be stronger than (6).
For two reasons we are looking for a definition of the R/s in which
the y does not occur: firstly, it is then that we can expect the proof of
the universal truth of (8) to amount to something -and, thereby, to
contribute to the argument-, secondly, we would like to conclude the
universal truth of (7) -which does not mention y at all!- from the
definition of the R/s. In other words, we propose a definition of the R/s
which does not refer to y at all: only with such a definition does the
replacement of (6) by (7) and (8) localize our dealing with y eompletely
to the proof of the universal truth of (8).
Because we want to define the R/s independently of y, because initially
we cannot assume that for some j-value y[j] = h(y) holds, and because
(8) must hold initially, we must guarantee that initially
(9) (Aj: RJ)
holds. Because, initially, all the h[j] are true, the initial truth of (9)
is guaranteed if the R/s are defined in such a way that we have
(10) (Ej: non h[j]) or (Aj: RJ).
We observe, that (10) is again of the recognized ugly form we are trying
to get rid of. We have some slack - that is what the R/s are being intro-
duced for - and this is the moment to decide to try to come away with
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a stronger -but what we have called: "structurally more pleasant"-
relation for the definition of the R;'s, from which (10) immediately follows.
The only candidate I can think of is
(11) (Aj: non h[j] or R j )
and we can already divulge that, indeed, (11) will be one of the defining
equations for the R/s.
From (11) it follows that the algorithm will now start with all the
R/s true. From (8) it follows that the truth of RJ can be appreciated as
"the equation y[j] = fj(y) need not be satisfied", and from (7) it follows
that in our final state we must have all the R/s equal to false.
Let us now look at the alternative construct
Ll: <ify[i]=ft(y)-+h[i]:=false>
[] y[i]:~ft(Y) -+ y[i]; = fi(y»;
L2j: (Aj: <hfj]: = true»
fi
We observe that the first alternative sets h[i] false , and that the second
one, as a whole, sets all h[j] true. As far as the universal truth of (11)
is concerned, we therefore conclude that in the first alternative Rt is
allowed to , and hence may become false, but that in the second alternative
as a whole, all R/s must become true.
Let us now confront the two atomic alternatives with (8). Because,
when the first atomic alternative is selected, only y[i] = ft(y) has been
observed, the universal truth of (8) is guaranteed to be an invariant of
the first atomic alternative, provided it enjoys the following property (12):
In the execution of the first atomic alternative
( y [i ] = f !(y ) -+ h[i] :=false>
(12) no RJ for j:;i=i changes from true to false .
Confronting the second atomic alternative
<y[i]:;i=ft(y) -+ y[i]: = My»
with (8), and observing that upon its completion none of the relations
y[j] = !J(y) needs to hold, we conclude that the second atomic alternative
itself must already cause a final state in which all the R/s are true, in
spite of the fact that the subsequent assignments h[j] : = true -which
would each force an RJ to true on account of (11)- have not been executed
yet. In short: in our definition for the R/s we must include besides (11)
another reason why an Rj should be defined to be true.
As it stands, the second atomic alternative only modifies y, but we
had decided that the definition of the R/s would not be expressed in terms
of y! The only way in which we can formulate the additional reason for
an Rj to be true is in terms of an auxiliary variable (to be introduced in
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a moment), whose value is changed in conjunction with the assignment
to y[i]. The value of that auxiliary variable has to force each RJ to true
until the subsequent assignment <h[j] := true> does so via (11). Because
the second atomic alternative is followed by N subsequent, separate atomic
actions <h[j]: = true> -one for each value of j-, it stands to reason that
we introduce for the i-th component CPntf an auxiliary local boolean array
8f with elements 8,[j] for 0 <.j < N. Their initial (and "neut ral" ) value is
true. The second atomic alternative of L 1 sets them all to false , the atomic
statements L2j will reset them to true one at a time.
In contrast to the variables y and h, which are accessible to all com-
ponents -which is expressed by calling them "global variables"-, each
variable 8, is only accessible to its corresponding component cpnt, -which
is expressed by calling the variable 8( "local" to component cpnie- ,
Local variables give rise to so-called " local assertions" . Local assertions
are most conveniently written in the program text of the individual
components at the place corresponding to their truth: they state a truth
between preceding and succeeding statements in exactly the same way
as is usual in annotating or verifying sequential programs. If a local
assertion contains only local variables, it can be justified on account of
the text of the corresponding component only.
In the following annotated version of cpnt( we have inserted local
assertions between braces. In order to understand the local assertions
about 8( it suffices to remember that 8( is local to cpnu , The local assertion
{Rt} in the second atomic alternative of Ll is justified by the guard
y[i]:;t:f((y) in conjunction with (8). We have further incorporated in our
annotation the consequence of (12) and the fact that the execution of
a second alternative will never cause an R, to become false : a true R(
can only become false by virtue of the execution of the first alternative
of L1 by Cpntf itself! Hence, R( is true an through the execution of the
second alternative of cpnt,.
cpnt, :
LO: do «Ej : h[j]» ~ {(Aj : Sf[j])}
L1: <if y[i]= f,(y) ~ h[i]: =false>{Aj: 8([j]}
[] y[i]:;t:ft(y) ~
{Rf}y[i] : = ft(y);
(Aj: 8([j]: = false»{R( and (Aj : non s,[j])} ;
L2j : (Aj: {Rl and non 8l[j]}<h[j]:=true; Sl[j] :=true»
fi {(Aj : 8l[j])}
od
On account of (11) RJ will be true upon completion of L2j. But the
second atomic alternative of Ll should already have made R, true, and
it should remain so until L2j is executed. The precondition of L2j, as
given in the annotation, hence tells us the "other reason besides
(11) (Aj : non h[j] or Rj )
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why an R j should be defined to be true":
(13) (Ai,j: non R, or sl[j] or R j ) .
Because it is our aim to get eventually all the R/s false, we define the
R/s as the minimal solution of (11) and (13), minimal in the sense of:
as few R/s true as possible.
The existence of a unique minimal solution of (11) and (13) follows
from the following construction. Start with all R/s false -all equations
of (13) are then satisfied on account of the term "non Ri">. If all equations
of (11) are satisfied as well, we are ready -no true R/s at all- ; otherwise
(11) is satisfied by setting Rj to true for all j -values for which h[j] holds.
Now all equations of (11) are satisfied, but some of the equations of (13)
need no longer be satisfied: as long as an (i, j)-pair can be found for which
the equation of (13) is not satisfied, satisfy it by setting that Rj to true:
as this cannot cause violation of (11) we end up with the R/s being a
solution of (11) and (13). But it is also the minimal solution, because
any Rj true in this solution must be true in any solution.
For a value of i , for which
(14) (Aj: StU])
holds, the above construction tells us that the truth of Rt forces no
further true R/s via (13) ; consequently, when such an R( becomes false,
no other Rrvaluos are then affected. This, and the fact that the first
atomic alternative of Ll is executed under the truth of (14) tells us,
that with our definition of the R/s as the minimal solution of (11) and
(13), requirement (12) is, indeed, met.
We have proved the universal truth of (8) by defining the R/s as the
minimal solution of (II) and (13). The universal truth of (7), however,
is now obvious. If the left-hand term of (7) is false, we have
(Aj: non h[j]),
and (11) and (13) have as minimal solution all R/s false, i.e.
(Aj: non R j )
which is the second term of (7). From the universal truth of (7) and (8),
the universal truth of (6) follows, and our proof is completed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This note has been written with many purposes in mind :
1) To give a wider publicity to an unusual problem and the mathematics
involved in its solution.
2) To present a counterexample contradicting the much-propagated and
hence commonly held belief that correctness proofs for programs are
only laboriously belabouring the obvious.
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3) To present a counterexample to the much-propagated and hence
commonly held belief that there is an antagonism between rigour and
formality on the one hand and "understandability" on the other.
4) To present an example of a correctness proof in which the first-order
predicate calculus is used as what seems an indispensable tool.
5) To present an example of a correctness proof in which the first-order
predicate calculus is a fully adequate tool.
6) To show how fairly general - almost "syntactic"- considerations about
the formal manipulations involved can provide valuable guidance for
the discovery of a surprising and surprisingly effective argument, thus
showing how a form al discipline can assist "creativity" instead of
-as is sometimes suggested- hampering it.
7) To show how also in such formal considerations the principle of sepa-
ration of concerns can be recognized as a very helpful one.
I leave it to my readers to form their opinion whether with the above
I have served these purposes well.
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